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OPERATIONS GROUP FILE

APR 28 →

C O N F I D E N T I A L 281703Z APR 80 STAFF

BBC
Brindisi
EC

CITE FBIS/LONDON 25094

TO: FBIS, FBIS/VIENNA.

REFS: A. FBIS 10624
B. FBIS/VIENNA 47160

[redacted] 25X1

1. FOLLOWING FROM [redacted] 25X1

A. BBC AUDIBILITY SURVEY IN JULY 1978 CONFIRMED THAT ALL MAJOR YUGOSLAV RADIOS WITH EXCEPTION OF LJUBLJANA AND NOVI SAD COULD BE MONITORED THROUGHOUT BROADCAST DAY FROM BRINDISI AREA. AGREE FULLY WITH FBIS HQS THAT PRISTINA, SKOPJE AND TITO-GRAD BE COVERED FROM BRINDISI; WOULD WELCOME VIEWS ON WHETHER SARAJEVO SHOULD BE ADDED TO BRINDISI COVERAGE. GRATEFUL FOR AN UPDATE OF MONITORABILITY OF SARAJEVO IN VIENNA.

B. BBC WOULD BE PREPARED TO TDY TWO SERBO-CROATION MONITORS TO BRINDISI AND [redacted] WOULD BE ONE OF THEM. HE DID MACEDONIAN WHILE STILL IN FBIS (LEFT KYRENIA IN 1959); HAS ALSO DONE MOSCOW MACEDONIAN AT CAVERSHAM. HE IS CERTAINLY CAPABLE OF PRODUCING PROGRAM SUMMARIES OF SKOPJE CASTS AND FULL SUMMARIES OF ITEMS REQUIRING FURTHER PROCESSING. HE COULD NOT BE EXPECTED AT THIS STAGE TO TEXT SKOPJE MATERIAL. HOWEVER, BEING KEENLY INTERESTED IN USING HIS MACEDONIAN, HE MAY EVENTUALLY BE CAPABLE OF PROCESSING SKOPJE ITEMS TEXTUALLY BUT ONLY AFTER FEW MONTHS OF ON-THE-JOB TRAINING. 25X1

C. BBC'S BULGARIAN/MACEDONIAN MONITOR [redacted] COULD ALSO BE CONSIDERED FOR BRINDISI OPERATION BUT WE WOULD HAVE CERTAIN RESERVATIONS. [redacted] IS 60, HIS MACEDONIAN MONITORING HAS BEEN STRICTLY LIMITED TO MOSCOW AND HE LACKS DETAILED KNOWLEDGE OF YUGOSLAV AFFAIRS NEEDED FOR EFFECTIVE MONITORING OF YUGOSLAV RADIOS. 25X1 25X1

D. ON BALANCE, BBC WOULD BE MORE IN FAVOR OF TDYING SPOLIAR WHO COULD DO INITIAL SAMPLING OF SKOPJE CASTS IN ADDITION TO

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HIS SERBO-CROATION MONITORING. HOWEVER, IT WOULD BE BEST TO LEAVE ANY FINAL DECISIONS ON THIS AND RELATED MATTERS UNTIL WE CAN SEE MORE CLEARLY WHICH WAY EVENTS DEVELOP IN YUGOSLAVIA IN POST-TITO PERIOD.

E. BBC CANNOT CONTRIBUTE MUCH TO DISCUSSION ON ALBANIAN STAFFING IN BRINDISI EXCEPT TO POINT OUT THAT ANY TELEPHONE FEEDS FROM BRINDISI TO VIENNA STRIKE BBC AS IMPRACTICABLE.

2. FROM DISCUSSIONS WITH EMBASSY COMMO OFFICERS, FEEDS VIA AUTOVON APPEAR IMPRACTICABLE. EMBASSY AUTOVON, WHICH HAS NO PATCH FACILITIES, IS ALREADY OVERTAXED AND CANNOT HANDLE ADDITIONAL TRAFFIC. OFFICERS ALSO CONFIRM MY FEARS (FROM EXPERIENCE IN OKI AND BK) THAT UNLESS WE HAVE FULLY DEDICATED AUTOVON CIRCUIT FROM MONITORING POINT TO PROCESSING POINT, WE WOULD PROBABLY NOT HAVE ACCESS TO CIRCUIT FOR MORE THAN FEW MINUTES AT ANY GIVEN TIME. AS EMBASSY POINTS OUT, MILITARY HAS OVERRIDE AUTHORITY AND EVEN NOW USES IT EXTENSIVELY. DURING CRISIS, SITUATION WOULD BE WORSE.

3. RVW 28 APR 86.

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